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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D,, Montana) 
For Release A. M. 's, Tuesday, June 11, 1957 
TH 'DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The Department of State should be our first hne of defense. The 
State Department should be t!le primary instrucment of the Executive for ad-
vancing the forei,:n relations of the Ur.ited States, It has long been acceptP-d 
by both political parties th· t the United States can speak w:.th only one voice 
in the conduct of foreign relations. Notwithstanding the inherent responsibility 
of the State DepartmentD as our interests abroad have expanded, an organiza-
tiona! structure has mush roomed permite.ng the United States to speak with 
many contradictory v ·ices. The State Department has become partially para-
lyzed in the exercise of its responsibility. It has become crippled as the 
autonomous agencies have circumvented its control in conducting foreign rela-
tions. :n particular, the United States Information Agency and the !nterna~ional 
Cooperation Administration are powerful autonomous instruments of United 
States fo ::- eign relations. 
While it is regrettable that these agencies daily shape the course 
oi our foreign relations without the benefit of close State Department direction, 
it is more to be regretted tha t the Secretary of State is a foremost advocate 
of this dualism. 
The position taken by the Secretary of State on numerous occasions 
hr:.G b:xn that these foreign operation functions of the United States government 
cannot be incorporated within t!le State Department. The reason advanced is 
thfl.t the Department would then not be free to engage in policy-making. The 
Dept. Of Stac.e and Conduct of 
Foreign Relations 5-29 
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Secretary of State is not alone is this mistaken view. It may be granted that 
policy making is an important aspect of our foreign relations. There must 
be United States representation in the United Nations and in the World's 
capitols. There is a continuing need for high-level consultation, negotia-
tion, coordination of State interests, and treaty making. But this historical 
picture of diplomacy does not entirely satisfy the present needs of United 
States foreign relations. 
With the growth of economic and m:litary strength and political 
leadership, the responsibilities of the United States have expanded proportion-
ately. Foreign relations is no longer solely a matter of representation and 
involves 
treaty making, but/the entire range of our global operations. Foreign 
policy is no longer something that can be coined exclus ively within cloistered 
walls. For while the State Department is conceiving policy, actual policy 
is also being made by the operations of the quasi-independent agencies 
negotiating daily with foreign governments -- dailycil.etermining the course 
of our foreign relations. A sharp line cannot be drawn between policy and 
operations. Operational activities of the agencies are not distinct from 
policy, but are rather the life and breath of foreign policy. 
At present the agencies have separate headquarters in Washing-
ton and separate establishments in the field. In Washington, the theoreti-
cal organizational chart provides for top-level policy coordination by the 
Department of State. In practice, the policy is either lost in the course 
of implementation or the policy is simply a rubber-stamping of what has 
become a defacto decision of the agency. In the field, in theory, the agency 
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is under the umbrella of the ambassador. In practice: the field agency re-
ports to its headquarters in Washington. Under present organization it is 
virtually imposs:ble for the S-::ate Department to initiate and control policies 
in Washington or for the a.c.obas sailors to control policy in the field. 
Mr. President, were this a mere question of internal organ5. z::~.tion 
only o£ concern to the Administration, we would not burden the Senate, it is, 
however, a matter o:f conc ern to the Senate, affecting as it does the course of 
United States foreign relations, We may enumerate the specific consequences ; 
1. In the absence of continuing and direct supervision by 
the State Department~ the c.gencies tend to mushroom their activities 0 often. 
engaging in projects or programs not directly related to the key foreign policy 
objectives in the area. 
2. The activities of the agencies often work at counter-
purposes to other agencies or to the Department of State, 
3. The present practice of multi-agency operations abroad 
results in the 11 snowballing" of Arne ric an personnel. A point is reached at 
which the presence of large numbers of Americans in a country works more 
against our interests than the program works to our interest. It is the 
familiar pattern, As the contingent increases in size, it is accompanied by the 
Post Exchange, American automobiles, American salaries, American high 
schools, American standards of living, and inevitably local animosity and 
fdction. 
4. The lack of central unified operations within the State 
Department makes for a duplication of administrative functions and tends to 
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build up excessive housekeeping services and personnel, This m akes for 
inefficiency u. .c.l waste, boosting the cost and lowering tb.e effectivenes s of 
our program. Qua.Ety is sacrificed to quantity. It incurs administrative 
problems growing out of diJ~a :ci:y in salaries, emoluments, and service s 
amon~ pe:::-sonnel of the separate agencies. 
5. It places the United States ambassador in an untenable 
position. While the ambassador waits to negotiate high policy, the minor 
officials of the agencies maintain daily contact with the officials of the 
country. This is often at the Permanent Secretary or Ministerial level. 
These contacts give continuing shape to United States foreign policy. If 
there is a serious question at issue, the agency refers tt back for decision to a 
desk officer in his agency in Washington. The desk officer of the U . S. 
Information Agency or the International Cooperation Administration in Wash-
ington then makes a decision and United States policy is made. Ordinarily, 
this desk officer knows a great deal about the particular problems of his 
area, but is not expected to know the broader implicat ions of total Unite d 
States foreign policy. Yet this desk officer makes the day-to-day policy 
cutting the ground from under the State Department in Washington and leav-
ing the ambassador in an awkward position. In this role, the ambassador 
is a ceremonial totem pole . The officials of the country look to the minor 
agency officials as the source of the living, real, dynamic day-to-day policy. 
The ambassador spends considerable time trying to catch up and cover up 
the operations of these minor agency officials. While the ambassador's 
economic affairs officer, public information officer or political affairs 
Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 38 , Folder 74, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
- 5 -
officer -- the regular foreign service personnel -- are transmitting cables to 
Washington formulating high policy, the agency personnel are already way 
ahead implementing either that policy or its diametric opposite, Too often 
it is the opposite, Tragic as it may seem, in too many instances the focus 
of real power of the United States under this system is not the ambassador 
but the agency head, The agency head too often not only has the monopoly 
of decision upon the concrete issues, but has an edge on the emoluments of 
prestige and power. In some instances the agency heads even have had larger 
villas, more expensive automobiles and more lavish representation allowances 
than the ambassador, In his recent testimony before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee the Director of the U. S, Information Agency characterized inte-
gration within the State Department as the "tail wagging the dog." The present 
status of the State Department is fairly clear. 
6, There is yet another aspect too often overlooked, During 
the post- war period these quasi-independent agencies have been established 
to meet the United States 1 world-wide responsibilities believed to be of an 
emergency or temporary nature. The economic collapse of Europe, the 
resurgence of militant communism, the cold war, the Korean War and its 
aftermath all have called for large-scale United States operations abroad. 
To the extent that these have been massive operations and to the extent that 
they have been conceived as non-recurrent measures, there has been some 
just ification for the autonomous agency. We now are faced, however, with a 
new premise -- a new point of departure calling for a changed outlook. That 
is what appears to be the evident truth that while some programs may be 
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phased out at an early date, other operations of the United States abroad 
are of such nature as to continue beyond the foreseeable future, Recognizing 
this, two conditions are evident: First, the e?O stence of the autonomous 
agency tends to perpetuate those functions which could be phased-out at an 
early date. Secondly, those remaining non-military functions that are 
recognizably of a permanent nature should be established on a permanent 
basis within a permanent department of the government, It would appear 
that the total overseas personnel establishment could then be greatly re-
duced. Programs could then be administered by career personnel on a 
sound business -like basis, Above all, they should be closely geared to all 
other foreign operations of the United States and they should be administered 
in close harmony with United States foreign policy objectives, These condi-
tions can only be met by incorporating the present autonomous agencies 
within the Department of State, Only by establishing the organization on a 
permanent basis will it be possible to phase out those programs that are not 
of a permanent nature, 
Ironic as it may seem, one important consequence of the State 
Department's loss of control over many of the most important instruments 
of foreign policy is that the State Department must take the blame for the 
mistakes of the other agencies of government operating abroad. If the 
Voice of America makes a mistake damaging to our relations with a country 
or an area, who takes the blame? If the Department of Defense makes a mis-
take in its activities abroad, who takes the blame? If the International Coop-
eration Administration approves a grant to a country when it could have 
obtained a loan from the Export-Import Bank, who takes the blame? 
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In each case, it is the Department of State which takes the blame 
both in the eyes of foreign nations and in the eyes of our own citizens, 
Power and respor.sibility must be inextricably linked together for 
the efficient conduct of the £oreign c:.f:fairs of this nation. That is not now the 
case, 
One other illustration. The CommHtee on Foreign Relations has 
recently gone through the process of considering the Mutual Security Act of 
1957. This is probably the most important foreign policy measure to be 
considered each year by the Congress, It provides the Congress with an 
opportunit~r to review the impact of the United States around the world. It 
gives the Congress an opportunity to question and to support, or reject, 
foreign policy is sues throughout the world, 
But who has the responsibility for presenting this program to the 
Congress? The presentation this year has been handled by the General 
Counsel of the International Cooperation Administration. Last year the 
presentation was handled by a short-term employee of the International 
Cooperation Administration. I do not reflect on these men and their ability. 
They have done fine work, But I submit, Mr. President, that Congress 
is as interested in foreign policy as the Secretary of State. I submit that 
just because the Secretary of States wants to relegate what he calls 
11 ope'l'ations 11 to the outlying realms of the Executive Branch, Congress should 
not be expected to accept trancated presentatinns of the foreign policies of the 
Un{ted States: even when put forth by ab'!.e men from the operations coordinat-
ing facilities of tbe Executive Branch. 
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I do not insist that the Secretary of State drop his numerous 
duties to sit with the Committees of Congress for days as they consider 
the mutual security legislation, But I do ask that the Department of State 
assume its responsibility for the coordination of foreign policy, I ask, 
for example, that it take the initiative in bringing together the scattered 
activities that have developed as the result of the generation of foreign 
currencies in surplus disposal programs throughout the world, 
The foreign policy of this nation can never become an effective 
instrument to advance the national interest if we insist on administering 
it on a blunderbuss, shotgun basis. 
These conclusions are not based solely upon personal ob s·ervations 
but are confirmed by numerous reports of my distinguished colleagues who 
have examined our programs around the world, The need for bringing these 
programs closer within the State Department has been voiced by committees 
of both the Senate and the House of Representatives as well as by private 
agencies. 
The Brookings Institution, in its report on the administrative 
aspects of Foreign Assistance Programs, prepared for the Special Senat e 
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, states pointedly: 
The present tendency of the executive branch has been to 
divorce the /State/ Department as far as possible from 
operations, and to develop it only as a policy agency, 
The transplanting of the International Cooperation Admin-
istration functions into the Department was largely the 
result of Congressional pressure and was accepted only 
with reluctance. Thus, many questions will remain 
difficult to settle until there is more agreement on the 
appropriate status and role of the Department of State, 
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The Special Senate Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, 
in its report on May 13, 1957, states: 
/The Comm ittee/ suggests that the Secretary of State 
reexamine hi s position on this question with a view 
to continuing c1.!:.d spe eding of the process of integra-
tion of the Inte rnational Cooperation Administration 
into the Department, 
The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Overseas 
Information Programs made on June 15: 19 53, stated with respect to the 
then existing separate agencies: 
The argument for sepa .. ·ate agencies must be weighed 
against the cost, the increas e d personnel and the dangers 
of conflicting influences on foreign policy growing out 
of separate programs. 
The Subcommittee on Technical Assistance of the Senate Foreign 
Rela tions Committee stated in its re;>ort on May 7, 1956: 
The subcommitt ee is not entirely satisfied with the 
extent to which the International Cooperation Administra-
tion has been integrated with the Department of State • , • 
It urges the Secretary of Statep who is the official pri-
marily responoible~ to pursue the matter more vigor-
ously. 
The evidence would seem to contradict any possible belief that 
the United States is now achieving its policy objectives by speaking with 
many voices, We are beginning to reap the consequences of innundating 
the world with American personnel all bent upon diverse purposes. The 
recent anti-American riots in Formosa, whatever the justice of the incident, 
indicate, ~' the close relationship of every American activity abroad 
to the attainment of policy objectives. S e condly, the anti-American riots 
indicate that, even in a country considered to be a staunch ally, there exists 
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an underlying resentment that must have been simmering beneath the sur-
face for some time. It points to the conclusion that policy objectives might 
better be achieved by a qualitative, integrated approach than through a massive 
unleashing of a multitude of agency personnel. In Japan current anti-Ameri-
canism is focused upon the Girard case involving the shooting of a Japanese 
woman gathering scrap metal on a firing range. The Japanese people are 
aroused against the testing of nuclear weapons. Before that it was against 
the use of sacred Mount Fujiyama as a firing range for artillery. Before 
that it was isolated instances of non-conformance by American personnel. 
Whatever the surface issue, the underlying resentment is related to the 
present multifarious, quantitative approach. It points again to the need 
for lodging foreign operations within the Departmmt of State. The Girard 
case in Japan is illustrative. Inconceivable as it may seem, instead of the 
State Department initiating, administering, and controlling United States 
operations, this case never reached Ambassador MacArthur but was re-
ferred to the Department of Defense in Washington. From Korea, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia come reports that the efforts of one agency 
to build up the economy are being diluted by another policy respecting ex-
change rates on the dollar. The government of Madras State in India 
contends that tm Neiveli Lignite development program has been hold up for 
three years while the plans have been shuttled between the I. C. A., the 
State Department, the Bureau of Mines and the Patent Office. From 
Afghanistan and Iran are reports that present operations on the Helmand and 
Karadj Dams are salvage operations based largely on earlier ill-conceived 
actions of autonomous agencies. 




These cases could be elaborated, They point to the conse-
quences of spec..:dng with rnany voices. 
The Pres i dcc"t ha.s the power under the Reorganization Act and 
the Mutual Security Act as amended to return the State Department to a 
strong position of leadership in the conduct of the foreign relations of the 
United St::ttes. I sugge s t that it may well h e the sense of t!J.e Congress 
that the Preside::tt assume the initiative to that end. 
